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Abstract
Background: Although health is a right of all individuals without any distinction, the realisation of this right has
remained very difficult for the marginalised populations of poor countries. Inequitable distribution of health
opportunities globally is a major factor in explaining why this is the case. Whereas the Protection, Promotion and
Fulfilment of the health rights of poor country citizens are a joint responsibility of both domestic and external
governments, most governments flout their obligations. So far disproportionate effort has been dedicated to
reaffirming and interpreting these obligations as opposed to investigating the fundamental question regarding why
these obligations have nevertheless remained largely unfulfilled. Further the normative question regarding what
ought to be done about the shortcomings of current obligations has been largely ignored.
Methods: We conduct a critical content analysis of existing literature on efforts towards the realisation of the
health rights of marginalised populations in our attempt to ascertain their capacity to guarantee basic health
opportunities to marginalised populations. In our analysis we treat issues of ‘health rights’ and ‘justice in global
health’ as having unity of purpose – guaranteeing basic health opportunities to the marginalised populations.
Results: We identify two sets of reasons for the failure of present obligations for global distributive justice in
general: a set of ‘superficial reasons’ and a set of ‘fundamental reasons’ which account for the superficial reasons.
Discussion: In order to overcome these reasons we propose a strategy which consists in specifying a number of
minimum and less-demanding obligations for both external and domestic governments to guarantee to all
individuals a certain threshold of health goods and services. We argue that these minimum obligations can be
freely accepted and fully complied with or enforced with “a thin system of enforcement” without significant threat
to national sovereignty and autonomy.
Conclusion: The futility of countries’ obligations for the health rights of the global poor as is the case with global
distributive injustice is because of lack of political will to specify and enforce such obligations. Minimum obligations
should be specified and enforced with a “thin system” which is consistent with principles of national sovereignty
and autonomy.
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Background
Although health is a right of all individuals without any dis-
tinction its realisation has remained extremely problematic
for most citizens of poor countries. Inequitable distribution
of health opportunities in form of health resources (and
other social determinants of health) both within and be-
tween countries is one of the major impediments to the
realisation of the health rights of the globally marginalised
populations. Given the close connection between fairness
in the distribution of health resources and the realisation of
health rights for all, we place our discussion in the broader
context of global distributive justice and countries’ domes-
tic and extraterritorial obligations to ensure justice in the
distribution of health opportunities. On the basis of princi-
ples 55 and 56 of the UN Charter [1]; the wide recognition
of Official Development Assistance (ODA) target of 0.7 of
GNP [2]; the nature and scope of countries’ obligations for
the realisation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ESCR) as interpreted by The Limburg principles [3] espe-
cially paragraph 26, our discussion naturally covers both
domestic and extraterritorial obligations for global distribu-
tive justice which are for the most part framed as human
rights obligations. Our point of departure is a key note that
despite the current wide political recognition of countries’
joint responsibility to ensure global distributive justice of
which health is one dimension, most countries do not fully
comply with their obligations and consequently global dis-
tributive injustice has continued to deepen. Whereas this
fact and its consequences for the health rights of Low
Income Country (LIC) citizens are well known, the hard
question regarding why most countries do not fully comply
with their obligations has been largely avoided. This paper
examines the reasons why, to a larger extent, most coun-
tries’ obligations have remained futile. After accounting for
this futility, we go ahead to propose what ought to be done
about this situation.
In this analysis our major concern is with the dimension
of global justice which has been labeled “global social just-
ice” by the United Nations (UN) [4], and more specifically
described as “global distributive justice” by Charles Beitz
[5]. Our interest is in how the latter affects the realisation
of the health rights of marginalised populations of devel-
oping countries. Our discussion is based on the thinking
that “social justice derives from equality of rights for all
peoples and the possibility for all human beings, without
discrimination, to benefit from the economic and social
progress disseminated and secured through international
cooperation” (emphasis added) [4]. Our discussion is also
based on the UN’s recognition that “[…] The international
human rights system is an important way of advocating
and enforcing fairer distribution of resources in the world”
[4]. Further, the discussion demonstrates that the reverse
of the UN’s view is also true; that is, a fairer distribution of
global health opportunities especially health resources, will
go a long way towards guaranteeing basic health rights to
marginalised populations. Hence, we are here treating
human rights obligations and obligations defended in philo-
sophical debates about global distributive justice as flip
sides of a coin in the pursuit of global distributive justice
and/or the realisation of the health rights of the global poor.
We shall provide an account for the failure of countries’ ob-
ligations at two levels: the first level consists of reasons that
can be regarded as ‘superficial’. These reasons arise from
the lack of precision and rigour in current obligations as
well as their lack of an enforcement mechanism. The
second level of our account is a set of what we regard as
‘fundamental reasons’ which account for the superficial rea-
sons. The analysis ends with a normative case for a piece-
meal strategy that can ensure an incremental achievement
of justice in the global distribution of health opportunities
thereby leading to consistent progress in the realisation of
the health rights of marginalised populations. Central to
the strategy we propose the adoption of Martha
Nussbaum’s “minimal conception of social justice” [6] as
key to understanding the requirements and the feasibility
of global distributive justice. In particular the extrapola-
tion of Nussbaum’s concept of the “minimum” is more
relevant in discussions of the right to health in light of the
concept of “Core obligations” of States Parties outlined in
paragraphs 43–45 of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) General
Comment number 14.
Preliminaries
Since our discussion is grounded in global distributive
justice and the basic rights of marginalised populations,
we have chosen to focus on the rights of the global poor
who suffer most from current global resource maldistri-
bution and hence cannot realise their right to basic
health services. In our analysis we will not be concerned
with the question of whether there are morally binding
transnational obligations for distributive justice. This is a
crucial background question for the kind of analysis we
are engaged in. Although there still persists some theor-
etical controversy on the legitimacy of stringent trans-
national obligations of distributive justice, we treat this
question as settled with an affirmative answer. We base
our enquiry on the implied acceptance of these obliga-
tions by countries as reflected in their various political
commitments, such as Official Development Assistance
(ODA), ratification of the relevant human rights instru-
ments among others. Our view is that these political
commitments can be interpreted as promises made by
countries to implement and fulfil obligations suggested
by those documents and instruments. There are several
views that have convincingly demonstrated that such
promises give rise to morally binding obligations on the
promisor because they confer (moral) rights to the
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promisee [7–9]. Generally there are a number of financial
and other kinds of promises by developed countries to de-
veloping countries in the spirit of international cooper-
ation with a view of ensuring global distributive justice as
expressed in various ways [10–12]. However, despite these
political commitments global distributive injustice seems
to deepen even further and it is this situation that leads us
to the question of why this is the case. We need to empha-
sise that the futility of countries’ obligations refers to both
domestic and extraterritorial obligations of countries.
With regard to domestic obligations, emphasis is on obli-
gations of resource poor countries (or all countries that
claim a share of international health resources). Apart
from health financing which is treated as a special case in
our current discussion, there are other poor country obli-
gations such as equitable distribution of available health
resources, implementing evidence-based health policies
and programs and all those obligations suggested by the
concept of ‘governments and ministries of health as stew-
ards’ of health sectors.
To illustrate briefly the extent of the futility of extraterri-
torial obligations, for example, we can turn to a summary
of countries’ compliance with ODA targets. With respect to
High Income Countries (HICs), most of them have largely
not fully fulfilled their obligations emanating from ODA
promises. In its 1969 Report, the Pearson Commission rec-
ommended in reference to HICs that “… Public or govern-
ment assistance in the form of grants, or low or interest-
free loans should make up 0.70 % of the gross national
product by 1975 and in no case later than 1980 [12]. The
UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution confirming
this target as the minimum of ODA as early as 1970 [2]. Al-
though this target was initially controversial in the opinion
of some countries, it eventually gained wider acceptance by
a majority of member countries [2]. Whereas the accept-
ance of this target constituted a promise to the developing
countries, very few developed countries that accepted this
target have ever reached it. By 2009 the highest ever regis-
tered ODA as an average percentage of Gross National
Incomes (GNIs) of the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD) Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) was 0.33 % in 2005 [13],
while the lowest went as low as 0.22 % in 1997 [14]. The
consequence of this situation has been shown to be the
continuously deepening global inequalities and inequities in
the global distribution of wealth, health as well as general
quality of life [15]. This extent of futility of countries’ obli-
gations for global distributive justice partly explains the per-
sisting difficulty in fulfilling the health rights of developing
country citizens and other marginalised populations.
Results
Even though there are many categories of human rights
obligations under the two major categories - so-categorised
as positive and negative obligations - our discussion is
primarily concerned with the ‘positive obligations’ and in
particular the joint obligation of all countries to contribute
health resources sufficient to guarantee a certain minimum
level of health opportunities to all individuals globally. We
emphasise the concepts of ‘guaranteeing’ and the
‘minimum’ as key in demonstrating the futility of
current obligations. In this regard, our account for the
futility of current obligations consists in identifying
reasons why existing obligations and their various inter-
pretations do not, in practice; and cannot, in principle,
guarantee to the global poor access to a certain minimum
level of health goods and services and why it is extremely
difficult to judge States Parties as having made negligible
or no effort towards that end.
Reasons for the futility of current obligations
Our critical examination of the various attempts to ex-
plain the futility of current obligations of countries for glo-
bal distributive justice or fulfilment of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ECSR) [16, 17] reveals two levels or
categories of reasons for the futility of countries’ obliga-
tions. The first category is sieved directly from the manner
current obligations are framed. We call these reasons
‘superficial reasons’. However, a deeper investigation re-
veals that there are other reasons which explain the exist-
ence of these ‘superficial reasons’. We call these deeper
reasons ‘fundamental reasons’. Our view is that without
identifying these fundamental reasons the futility of coun-
tries’ obligations remains inexplicable. For that matter if
we are to successfully work around the current futility of
countries’ obligations we need a solution to these funda-
mental reasons. With regard to superficial reasons one
finds that by way of their phrasing and various attempts at
interpreting them, current obligations are deficient in pre-
cision and rigour regarding actions that both domestic
and external governments must take to ensure the realisa-
tion of global distributive justice and consequently the
health rights of LIC citizens (and other marginalised pop-
ulations). The second superficial reason is the absence of
an enforcement mechanism for these obligations. With re-
gard to fundamental reasons, we offer two explanations:
lack of political will to specify and enforce morally binding
obligations of global distributive justice and pessimism
about the desirability and feasibility of a coercive global
enforcement mechanism for these obligations.
Superficial reasons for the futility of current obligations
In our examination of the two superficial reasons men-
tioned above, we shall take lack of enforcement as self-
evident and at the same time treat its consequence for
countries’ compliance with their obligations as self-
explanatory. That is to say, lack of any perceived threat in
case of non-compliance with these obligations provides a
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strong temptation for governments to do as little as they
wish or nothing at all with regard to their obligations, par-
ticularly domestic resource allocations (in the case of Low
and Middle Income Countries (LMICs)) and international
resource transfers (in the case of High Income Countries
(HICs)). Therefore, a detailed analysis of superficial reasons
will be on illustrating how vagueness and lack of rigour in
current obligations make it easy for most national govern-
ments to defy their obligations. Further we argue that lack
of any perceived threat in cases of non-compliance, is what
makes this breach quite tempting and the lack of specific
and objective grounds for holding countries morally blame-
worthy if they flout their obligations.
To begin with, an examination of obligations of HICs re-
lating to health financing in LMICs reveals that the prom-
ises embedded in acts of countries’ ratifying the various
human rights instruments are vague. This vagueness denies
the purported obligations the rigour expected of obligations
of justice. In the first place current obligations are charac-
terised by a number of exception clauses which leave them
open for interpretation as to what countries are morally re-
quired to do in respect of the health rights of people out-
side their countries. This challenge makes it difficult to
objectively judge any external governments as morally
guilty of not fulfilling its obligations whenever they either
do too little or nothing at all to ensure that individuals out-
side their countries realise their basic health rights.
With regard to constrained rigour of current obligations
it is important to see how they have been interpreted.
External obligations (to assist) have been interpreted as
follows:
For the avoidance of any doubt, the Committee
wishes to emphasize that it is particularly incumbent
on States Parties and other actors in a position to
assist, to provide international assistance and
cooperation, especially economic and technical which
enable developing countries to fulfil their core and
other obligations (emphasis added) [18].
Whereas the use of expression “incumbent on” seems
to make this obligation rigorous enough, its stringency is
severely diminished by an addition of a proviso “those in
a position to assist”, yet, without going ahead to specify
how, in case of non-compliance, it could be objectively
determined whether a given State Party was in position
to assist or not. This means that even if there were an
enforcement mechanism for this obligation it would be
practically impossible to objectively claim that a State
Party has refused to honour its obligation. Therefore, it
can be inferred that if “obligations to assist” are understood
as obligations of justice which are meant to be stringent
(and potentially enforceable), then the current human
rights discourse does not effectively impose on HIC
governments any obligations of justice which can guarantee
to citizens of developing countries the realisation of their
right to basic health opportunities. That is, given the fram-
ing of current obligations to assist, external actors bear no
stringent obligation relating to international health resource
transfers to LIMCs and this partly explains why most of
these obligations have remained futile.
It is not only the HICs that have flouted their obliga-
tions. Most LMIC governments can be implicated in what
may count as injustice in health care and a violation of
health rights of their own citizens. The futility of some of
LIC governments’ obligations particularly human rights
obligations to their citizens can also be attributed to
vagueness and lack of rigour. As we mentioned earlier,
even though LMIC government obligations are numerous,
we shall here concentrate on health financing in order to
demonstrate our argument.
In the case of countries’ obligations to Promote, Pro-
tect and Fulfill Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
particularly the right to health [19], Article 2 (1) of the
ICESCR obligates each State Party to take the necessary
steps “to the maximum of its available resources” to the
realisation of these rights (emphasis added). This has
been interpreted to mean that:
In order for a State Party to be able to attribute its
failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations
to a lack of available resources it must demonstrate
that every effort has been made to use all resources
that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a
matter of priority, those minimum obligations [20].
In addition the World Health Organisation (WHO) has
emphasised that in determining the violations of the right
to health “it is important to distinguish the inability from
unwillingness of a State Party to comply with its obliga-
tions under article 12 [of the ICESCR]” [21]. A further
proviso is that “If resource constraints render it impossible
for a State Party to comply fully with its Covenant obliga-
tions, it has the burden of justifying that every effort has
nevertheless been made to use all available resources at its
disposal […] (emphasis added) [22]. This interpretation is
reproduced in the Maastricht Guidelines on violations of
ESCR (par. 13) [23], where the burden of proof of inability
falls on the State Party. It is important to bear in mind
that this clause also applies to HIC government obliga-
tions to assist. Further, regarding the determination of vio-
lations of obligation to fulfil, it has been interpreted that
violations of obligation to fulfil occur through, among
other things, a state’s “insufficient expenditure or misallo-
cation of public resources; […]” (emphasis added) [22].
What is crucial to note is that the essence of providing
these various interpretations is that they should be neither
vague nor ambiguous as to what they require of State
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Parties with a hope that such clarity will induce wide com-
pliance. However, these obligations as interpreted in Gen-
eral Comment 14 of ICESCR and other Principles and
Guidelines ([3, 23] still fail to overcome their vagueness,
plasticity and consequently some of these interpretations
have instead produced contradictions as shown below.
Whereas at first reading the above statements of obliga-
tions seem precise and rigorous enough, a critical examin-
ation of these phrases reveals serious problems with
regards to their precision and rigour. In the first place, how
much, or what percentage, of a country’s resources (GDP
or annual budget) allocated to health shall be accepted as
the maximum of resources available at its disposal to fulfil
the right to health? On this fundamental issue of “to the
maximum of its available resources”, paragraph 26 of the
Limburg Principles clarifies that “Its available resources
refers to resources within a state and those available from
the international community through international co-
operation and assistance”. However, still there is no sugges-
tion as to how much of such external resources each LIC is
entitled to or an officially recognised mechanism of how to
determine such amounts of resources. We have proposed,
defended and demonstrated such a mechanism elsewhere
[24]. The current discretion regarding health resource allo-
cations is directly implied by paragraph 71 of the Limburg
Principles. The limit placed on the ‘margin of discretion’
given to States Parties in the above-mentioned paragraph
(in determining violations) is indeterminate; this limit is a
sort of thing about which reasonable people can disagree.
For example, in Uganda, whereas there has been wide pub-
lic and expert protest against the government’s neglect of
the health sector in budget allocations, bearing in mind that
the Abuja Declaration like all Declarations is not legally
binding to the extent that its implementation depends
purely on political will, there is no stringent and potentially
enforceable minimum percentage of national budgets that
must be allocated to health” [25–28]. Further, even though
the WHO has observed and recommended that all health-
aid recipient countries (in the WHO Africa region) need to
increase percentages of their domestically generated annual
budget resources to health, there is no specific level recom-
mended [29]. Therefore, current ‘obligations’ of countries
do not place any country under any obligation to allocate a
certain minimum of their financial resources to the health
of marginalised people and this partly explains why it has
remained very difficult for citizens of LICs and in some
MICs to realise their basic health rights.
Further, instead of clarifying obligations, some efforts at
interpreting these obligations have produced contradic-
tions with some of the key principles for implementation
of these obligations. One glaring contradiction pertains to
the essence of distinguishing between inability and unwill-
ingness to fulfill obligations. By making reference to para-
graphs 25 – 28 of the Limburg Principles, Paragraphs 9
and 10 of the Maastricht Guidelines on violations categor-
ically exclude ‘lack of resources’ as a valid excuse for fail-
ure of a State Party to fulfil its obligations. So, if the
essence of determining violations is either that a State
Party be reprimanded or be made to suffer sanctions, how
morally justified would the international community be in
reprimanding or punishing a State Party which is, because
of resource scarcity, unable rather than unwilling, to fulfil
its core minimum obligations ? Is the negation of ‘re-
source scarcity’ as an excuse limited to determining viola-
tions relating to obligations of ‘non-discrimination’ and
‘equity in resource allocation’ and the like? This specifica-
tion would make better sense but unfortunately in the
available literature there is nothing to suggest this.
Secondly, regarding the need to distinguish inability
from unwillingness of States Parties to comply with their
obligations, this requirement calls for precision in judg-
ing countries on their performances in order to be able
to objectively say that country ‘A’ is able but unwilling or
country ‘B’ is willing but unable to fulfill their obliga-
tions. The required precision in making this distinction
presumes the existence of a mechanism by which to
make this precise distinction, yet, there is no officially
recognised mechanism of such kind. Therefore, with re-
gard to resource allocations it is technically impossible
to objectively judge any country as unwilling or unable
to comply with its obligations. Hence, the seeming strin-
gency of this obligation again vanishes with the impossi-
bility of objectively judging any government as either
unwilling or unable to guarantee certain levels of health
opportunities to its citizens (in the case of LMICs).
In the case of HICs, it becomes impossible to objectively
claim that a country has flouted its obligation by transfer-
ring low or no amounts of health resources to LMICs. The
question here would be: ‘how much is such a State Party
morally required (or legally obliged) to transfer to LICs,
and/or particularly to which LIC, and how should it be de-
termined’? In the existing literature, particularly literature
on obligations and their various interpretations (with ex-
ception of ODA targets), it is extremely difficult, if possible
at all, to find an answer to this question. The consequence
of this is that lack of an impartial basis for assigning moral
blame to governments for their unwillingness to ensure a
just level of health opportunities for marginalised individ-
uals globally leads to complacence among most govern-
ments. Even if the ODA target were to be accepted as the
actual size of positive extraterritorial obligations, the
present lack of coordination in international resource trans-
fers implies that still inequitable distribution of global
health resources would persist along with its consequence
for the realisation of the health rights of most LIC citizens.
Again, even if there were to be an enforcement mechanism
for this obligation, this lack of precision as to how to distin-
guish between countries’ inabilities and unwillingness to
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comply with their obligation to assist would make it ex-
tremely difficult to hold any government accountable.
Another attempt at précising governments’ obligations to
ensure the realisation of the right to health by guaranteeing
a certain minimum level of health opportunities to all indi-
viduals has been through the definition of “Core obliga-
tions” of States Parties as listed in the ICESCR, General
Comment 14, Paragraphs 43 to 45. But still these core
obligations in general simply specify what types of services
individuals must have access to while remaining noncom-
mittal on how much resources or what percentage of na-
tional budget (or even what percentage of external
resources) ought to be committed to such services. The
“minimum core obligations” as interpreted by Maastricht
Guidelines on violations still do not define the minimum
in, for example, Nussbaum’s terms of “some appropriate
threshold level” in her idea of the “minimal account of so-
cial justice” [6]. This kind of minimum which makes refer-
ence to a specific threshold would be a determinate level of,
for example, a minimum global health-resource per capita
which must be guaranteed to every individual through ful-
filment of domestic and extraterritorial obligations as we
demonstrated elsewhere [24].
What is noteworthy about core obligations is the
addition of “the right to health indicators and bench-
marks” [30] as operationalised in specifying targets for
health-related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs
Four to Six). We can see, of course, how health indicators
come close to a definition of a specific threshold, albeit at
the level of population health. However, in order to see
how these core obligations and health indicators and
benchmarks fail to guarantee the necessary precision in
holding governments accountable, it is important to look
at health indicators in relation to their resource/financial
implications.
Bearing in mind that “the right to health does NOT
imply the right to being healthy” (emphasis in original)
[21], specific health indicators and benchmarks in them-
selves are neither a sufficient nor necessary criterion for
judging a government’s performance on its obligations.
This is because the above disclaimer (what the right to
health does NOT imply) entails that poor population
health outcomes do not constitute conclusive evidence
that a State Party has not done the best it can in its spe-
cific resource context; nor would it be automatically in-
ferred from improvements in these indicators that a
State Party is performing to the best of its efforts in its
specific resource context. With reference to the latter
case what is implied is that the concept of “progressive
realisation” of the right to health (ICESCR Art.1 (2)) to-
wards “the highest attainable standard of health” [31] en-
tails that even if a country has achieved the prescribed
health indicators by investing less than the maximum of
its available resources, such a country will still be violating
the health rights of its citizens because it is unwilling to
give them more health opportunities towards the highest
attainable standard of health. Even though setting popula-
tion health indicator targets is very important for health
policy and program evaluations and appraisals etc., with-
out specifying the precise level of investment in health for
each country especially LICs, the idea of “the right to
health indicators” in itself does not help in objectively
judging governments’ performance.
Finally, the recognition by the UN Committee on
ESCR of extraterritorial obligations relating to ESCR
promises hope with regard to countries’ compliance with
their obligations. However, the impact of this recogni-
tion, especially on international resource transfer, will
largely depend on the precision regarding which State
Party should transfer how much resources to whom; or
on the recognition and implementation of a mechanism
such as one we proposed elsewhere [24]. However, this
explicit recognition is crucial for the negative obligations
of countries and their international companies (not to
violate ESCR of citizens where they operate), and for
providing clear complaint procedures and mechanisms
to those who think their rights have been (positively) vi-
olated as reflected in the Committee’s concluding obser-
vations on the second periodic report of China [32].
In summary, the above examination reveals that
current obligations of countries to guarantee the fulfil-
ment of at least the basic health rights of LIC citizens
and thereby ensure justice in global health are not yet
obligations in the real sense of obligations of justice
which specify moral requirements on the part of obliga-
tion bearers and moral rights on the part of the benefi-
ciaries of such obligations. The lack of specificity in
current obligations means that there are no objective
grounds for judging any State Party as having flouted its
positive obligation particularly relating to domestic re-
source allocation or international transfer. This situation
is worsened by the fact that there is no enforcement
mechanism for these obligations. But as the analysis
above has shown, it would still be pointless to have an
enforcement mechanism if it is impossible to objectively
judge any country as having flouted its obligations. The
ultimate consequence of these two weaknesses is that
currently governments perceive no impending threat
whenever they contemplate flouting their obligations,
whether the threat would be in form of moral blame or
a number of sanctions. At best current international re-
source transfers are treated as charity which falls under
the category of duties of humanity rather than obliga-
tions of justice and, therefore, cannot guarantee the ful-
filment of the relevant basic rights. But as mentioned
earlier there are underlying reasons which explain lack
of precision and rigour in current obligations as well as
lack of any enforcement mechanism in case of non-
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compliance with these obligations. This is the category
of reasons which we have called ‘fundamental reasons’.
Fundamental reasons for the futility of obligations for
global distributive justice
The superficial reasons for the futility of countries’ obliga-
tions for justice in global health are not spontaneous but
systematic. Our concern in going beyond the superficial
reasons is that even though the superficial reasons we
have pointed out above are not new and moreover efforts
have been made to respond to them through various inter-
pretations of obligations, it remains unclear why these ob-
ligations have remained vague and unenforceable. Our
major claim here is that at a fundamental level, lack of
specificity, rigour and enforcement of these obligations is
a symptom of general lack of political will on the part of
countries (or State Parties) to specify and enforce these
obligations. The second fundamental reason, and specific-
ally a reason for lack of an enforcement mechanism, is
general pessimism regarding both the desirability and
feasibility of coercive enforcement of these obligations.
We later show that these fundamental reasons are not in-
surmountable and that there are good reasons and possi-
bility to work around them if we want to gain any hope
for realising the health rights of marginalised populations.
There is general lack of political will on the part of
Sates Parties to specify and enforce obligations of global
distributive justice and this directly and negatively af-
fects the realisation of the health rights of marginalised
populations in LMICs. The evidence for the general lack
of political will to specify actions which countries ought
to take as a moral requirement to fulfill their obligations
for global distributive justice can be seen in the common
theoretical denial of the moral necessity and legitimacy of
transnational obligations for distributive justice. In discus-
sions of obligations of countries for global distributive
justice there is a widely shared claim that robust principles
of distributive justice and their consequent obligations do
not go beyond national borders [33–38]. Among these au-
thors Norman Daniels in particular imports this way of
thinking into discussions regarding justice in global health.
In consideration of the spirited arguments that these
authors have put up in defense of this position on the one
hand, and the current attitude towards ODA as reflected
in the practice of treating international resource transfers
as charity on the other, it is not unreasonable to assert that
these views have significantly influenced politics and pol-
icy, especially among external obligations bearers. So it is
very difficult to claim that lack of precision and enforce-
ment mechanism is an oversight, nor is it lack of cognitive
capacity to state such obligations in a more specific and
stringent manner. Rather it is due to lack of political will
that obligations are not framed and treated as real obliga-
tions of justice; that is, precise and potentially enforceable.
Apart from this theoretical controversy there is more sub-
tle evidence of lack of political will to specify and enforce
countries’ obligations for global distributive justice. But
before we adduce further evidence we need to emphasise
that we have taken it for granted that such obligations
exist but what is unclear are reasons why those who
believe that such obligations exist have not succeeded in
specifying and enforcing such obligations.
Further evidence for lack of political will can be traced
from the importance all countries attach to the political
values of national sovereignty and autonomy. We treat it as
self-evident truth that generally countries are unwilling to
give up their freedom in deciding how to manage their do-
mestic affairs such as budget allocations in the case of LIC
governments; and how much of their resources they must
give out in ODA or any other forms of bilateral or multilat-
eral assistance in the case of HIC governments. In this case
the worry is that by specifying what countries must do in
terms of domestic budget allocations and international
resource transfers with a possibility of enforcing such
decisions, countries are robbed of their sovereignty and
autonomy in deciding for themselves on these matters.
Therefore, our judgement is that the current phrasing –
vagueness and constrained rigour – of obligations as well
as reluctance to propose and implement an enforcement
mechanism is a politically cautious way of going about
transnational requirements for global distributive justice.
Therefore, the other fundamental reason for the futil-
ity of current obligations is a corollary or an extension
of the one above. It has more to do with the desirability,
legitimacy and feasibility of enforcement of these obliga-
tions against principles of national autonomy and sover-
eignty. In the view of the UN, for example:
[…] there is an inherent futility in working to achieve
greater equality between States in terms of
development when there is no authority able to
enforce measures that would ensure the realization of
such an objective. The United Nations does not
possess such authority. International organizations
with greater power and influence in economic and
financial matters, in particular the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), have different
mandates. A world government with an enforceable
mandate to ensure equality and justice between its
constituents is not on the immediate horizon [4].
This lack of effective and legitimate means to enforce
transnational obligations is the major source of pessimism
about the feasibility of enforcing obligations of global dis-
tributive justice in the same manner as it happens at a na-
tional level. But it can as well be said that the required
means (institution or agency) for enforcement can be
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created only if there is general, or at least widely shared,
political will to do so. Therefore, for as long as such an en-
forcement agency does not exist, then it is because there is
not yet willingness to create it.
With regard to the fundamental reasons outlined
above, lack of political will remains central. Further evi-
dence to this has been alluded to in a more direct way.
Such allusions have been made by pointing at serious
doubts regarding whether it can be possible to have a
truly democratic and fair global institution to do the en-
forcement. There are some views that there is particu-
larly fear of the threat of imperialism especially against
weaker states [37, 39, 40]. Nagel in particular points to a
dilemma stemming from ‘the need for effective institu-
tions and the threat of expanding tyranny’. In his view
“fortunate nations” fear such developments. “They there-
fore face the problem of how to create a global order
that will have its own legitimacy, but not the kind of le-
gitimacy that undermines strict limits on their responsi-
bilities [for the well-being of non-compatriots]” [37]. In
a footnote he adds that “The undemocratic rulers of many
poor nations have strong reasons of a different kind to
protect their sovereign authority against international en-
croachment (emphasis added)” [37]. This is an emphasis
of the importance all countries attach to national auton-
omy and sovereignty which, most countries believe, will
be eroded to some great extent by specifying and enfor-
cing transnational obligations of distributive justice to
which obligations for the health rights of LIC citizens be-
long. It is these political circumstances that account for
the general lack of specificity and rigour in obligations of
global distributive justice as well as reluctance to propose
and implement an enforcement mechanism which might
guarantee wider compliance with these obligations.
Therefore, whereas there is potential for developing
mechanisms for specifying and enforcing obligations of
countries for global distributive justice, there are deeper
reasons why the current obligations are vague and unen-
forceable. But the question arises: if current obligations
are not divested of the conditions that cause their futil-
ity, what is the future of global distributive justice? Can
the marginalised populations hope to realise even their
basic health rights in these circumstances which do not
guarantee anything to them? Judging from the current
daunting performances of most countries on their obli-
gations and the consequent trend in global distributive
justice particularly the global mal-distribution of health
opportunities as evidenced by the current trends in
global health resource allocation [41, 42], it is obvious
that unless the current conditions or reasons which ex-
plain the futility of current obligations are circumvented,
there is no hope that the marginalised populations will




Given our emphasis of the need to guarantee certain mini-
mum health opportunities to marginalised populations,
the first crucial step forward is to shift from relying on
charity (or perfectly voluntary ODA disbursements), to
specific and enforceable obligations of distributive justice
among all HIC governments and reject unlimited discre-
tion on LICs regarding health resource allocations in their
annual budgets. At a domestic level, such discretion is not
compatible with the idea of guaranteeing certain mini-
mum health opportunities. Further still, with regard to
ODA the key insight is that perfectly voluntary ODA dis-
bursements or any other forms international health re-
source transfers that treat such transfers as charity cannot
guarantee anything to the marginalised populations. A
moral reason for this shift has been offered by Nussbaum
in her agreement with Liam Murphy [43]. Nussbaum’s
view is that exclusive reliance on voluntary philanthropy
has a problem of failing to equitably distribute the burden
of alleviating poverty and suffering especially if only a few
have to contribute all that is necessary to solve the prob-
lem. She rightly observes that “Any system of voluntary
philanthropy has this problem”[6]. Another reason is Da-
vid Hume’s view regarding why we must move away from
benevolence to justice. In his view benevolence is inspired
by moral impulse and circumstances of unlimited abun-
dance and is therefore unreliable [especially in the current
global scarcity of resources] [44]. Lastly we hope that it is
possible to agree on certain minimum obligations, en-
forcement of which can be readily accepted by virtue of
the minimal burden they impose on external actors. This
is especially possible if it could be demonstrated that these
obligations impose a proportionate or fair burden on ex-
ternal actors1 and also such obligations are within the re-
source capacities of individual LICs. We can arrive at such
obligations through the adoption of what has been termed
“a minimal conception of social justice” [45].
One major and obvious reason for the futility obliga-
tions for the health rights of marginalised populations is
that all ESCR primarily require resources and yet there
is real scarcity of resources. So given this reality it would
be a slippery-slope choice to make ESCR justiciable or
adopt any measures purporting to guarantee their fulfil-
ment. This excuse can be overcome by the extrapolating
Nussbaum’s “minimal conception of social justice” into
reasoning about the feasibility of guaranteeing basic
health rights for the marginalised populations. The gist
of the idea of “a minimal account of social justice” in
Nussbaum’s view is that “a society that does not guarantee
these [fundamental entitlements/capabilities] to all its
citizens, at some appropriate threshold level, falls short of
being a fully just society, whatever its level of opulence”
[45]. Notwithstanding the ‘possible overstatement of this
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position with regard to judging a society as unjust’,2 par-
ticularly due to genuine and severe resource constraints
among most developing countries, Nussbaum’s view is still
very crucial in understanding the goals and limits of global
distributive justice, particularly the idea of basic health
goods and services which are supposed to be guaranteed
to all individuals as a matter of right. When applied to glo-
bal distributive justice, “a minimal conception of distribu-
tive justice” means that global justice does not aim at
achieving a perfectly equal distribution of resources be-
tween the global rich and the global poor. Rather, global
distributive justice on this account asks for a guarantee to
all global citizens “some appropriate threshold level of
capabilities” [6]. The concept of the minimum is already
widely implied as what is morally required for a just level
of material and social well-being – for example, the con-
cept of “minimum core obligations” used in the human
rights discourse; the Millennium Declaration, particularly
MDGs targets and the WHO’s concept of the minimum
health care which targets everybody’s access to an “Essen-
tial Health Package” [6] especially in low income countries,
among others. The implication we draw from the “minimal
conception of social justice” is that external obligations do
not have to be as demanding as they are currently thought
to be by those who are skeptical about morally binding
transnational obligations for global distributive justice.
Therefore, the power of the concept of the “minimum” is
that these obligations can reasonably be accepted and
fulfilled with “a thin system” of enforcement and in some
cases no enforcement at all and in both cases no significant
threat is posed to countries’ autonomy and sovereignty.
Shortly we will come to the issue of enforcement.
Therefore, with specific regards to justice in global
health particularly health financing, in order to fulfil the
health rights of marginalised populations what needs to be
done is to specify the minimum obligations for each set of
actors; that is, donor and recipient countries. Our discus-
sion has been intended to demonstrate that this specificity
and potential enforcement are critical requirements if a
certain minimum is to be guaranteed. The task of specify-
ing these obligations requires first of all establishing the
total cost of ensuring a minimum distribution of health
goods and services in each country (to which all individ-
uals should have a right) and ultimately the total cost for
all countries. It is this total cost that should be equitably
shared by the two sets of actors by specifying exactly what
portions external and domestic governments are jointly
morally required to contribute in order to cover the cost
of the minimum health opportunities which constitute the
basic health rights of marginalised populations [24]. After
this step, each set of actors should find a mechanism for
equitably sharing their quota of the burden, taking into
consideration differences in resource capacities of differ-
ent actors within each set of actors.
This can be briefly illustrated. Even though the WHO
provides an estimate of US$ 44 as the minimum health
expenditure per capita needed by citizens of LICs to
achieve the initial minimum or just health opportunities
(basic life-saving services), so far there is no suggestion as
to how the burden of raising this amount for each individ-
ual should be divided between LIC and HIC governments.
We have proposed and elaborated such a mechanism else-
where [24]. Once such specification has been made in a
manner that is acceptable as equitable between HIC and
LIC governments, it is reasonable to expect that each
party will fully comply with its obligations without coer-
cion or with the most minimum coercion that leaves
states’ sovereignty and autonomy unthreatened. But even
in the absence of enforcement, it will moreover be pos-
sible to objectively identify and assign moral blame to
States Parties that flout their very specific obligations.
Once the initial minimum of health opportunities or
health rights has been achieved in this manner, more in-
cremental obligations can be agreed upon and imple-
mented in a similar manner. Therefore, using the idea of
“a minimal conception of justice” which yields potentially
less demanding obligations, especially extraterritorial obli-
gations, along with “a thin system” of global enforcement,
it is possible to significantly reduce global health injustice
by being able to fulfil the basic health rights of margina-
lised populations of LICs in an incremental manner while
bypassing the deeply controversial theoretical and tech-
nical difficulties.
Regarding enforcement of countries’ obligations, our dis-
cussion has shown that all fundamental reasons for the fu-
tility of current obligations have something to do with fear
of potential erosion of national sovereignty and autonomy.
However, in her response to the unwillingness to specify
and enforce obligations of global distributive justice
stemming from a desire to maintain national autonomy
and sovereignty, Martha Nussbaum has convincingly ar-
gued that “[…] there is not any reason why a thin system of
global governance, with at least some coercive powers,
should not be compatible with the sovereignty and freedom
of individual nations” (emphasis added) [6]. However, in
her view the enforcement is supposed to apply to a broader
spectrum of all relevant actions as may be required for the
achievement of global justice in general, rather than imme-
diate redistribution of resources or health resources in par-
ticular. She espouses a very simple, democratic, and yet
potentially feasible model of enforcement like one sug-
gested by Thomas Pogge for enforcing his Global Resource
Dividend (GRD) proposal [46]. In respect of this view it
ought to be added that not only is it possible to enforce
obligations of global distributive justice without deeply
jeopardising national sovereignty and autonomy, it is also
a requirement if we are aiming at guaranteeing a certain
threshold of health opportunities to all marginalised
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populations and individuals. The evidence for the feasibil-
ity of this enforcement can be found in the existence and
demonstrated successful operation of regional blocs such
as the European Union (EU); the Economic Organisation
of West African Countries (ECOWAS) among others. In
all these arrangements there is an acceptable degree of
constraint on national autonomy and sovereignty.
Therefore, it is possible to enforce certain minimum
measures that do not ask too much in terms of countries’
autonomy and sovereignty. In this regard our view is
that Nussbaum’s concept of a minimal conception of
social justice, along with her proposal of a thin global
enforcement system are consistent with the political
values of national autonomy and sovereignty.
Lastly it is crucial to caution that in order to guarantee
the legitimacy of these obligations and their enforcement,
the relevant obligations and related decisions cannot be ar-
rived at arbitrarily and simply imposed on States Parties.
The process of determining specific obligations of each
country or State Party has to be democratic (involving
country representatives); evidence-based especially regard-
ing the optimum resource-capacities of different countries;
multidisciplinary in nature involving economists; health
economists; human rights lawyers; professional ethicists
and all relevant experts.
Conclusion
Current obligations of countries for global distributive just-
ice have been largely futile and this explains why it has
remained difficult for LIC citizens to realise their basic
health rights. This futility affects both domestic and extra-
territorial obligations. At a superficial level the futility of
countries’ obligations for global distributive justice can be
attributed to the vagueness and lack of rigour that charac-
terise them as well as their lack of enforcement. However, a
deeper examination of these reasons reveals that the weak-
nesses within these obligations are not spontaneous. They
are due to lack of political will to specify and enforce do-
mestic and transnational obligations of social or particularly
distributive justice. Further, reluctance to propose and im-
plement an enforcement mechanism for these obligations
is due to pessimism about the desirability and feasibility of
a global enforcement system which is feared to erode coun-
tries’ national sovereignty and autonomy, and at worst the
threat of imperialism. However, in the current global polit-
ical circumstances there is a lot of evidence that there can
be “a thin” and yet effective system of enforcement which is
consistent with countries’ rights to national autonomy and
sovereignty. Given the “minimal conception of social just-
ice” we should agree on less-demanding obligations which
guarantee, for example, a certain minimum amount of
health goods and services (expressed as minimum health
expenditure per capita per country) to all marginalised pop-
ulations. We envisage that such obligations will be easily
fulfilled with minimum or no enforcement at all. With
regards to health financing, since it is possible to know the
required minimum health expenditure per capita of each
citizen in LICs, the obligation to meet these costs should
be equitably apportioned between LIC and HIC govern-
ments by specifying exactly what portion each actor
should contribute, taking into account the optimal re-
source capacity of each set of actors and individual actors
within each set. Other obligations, especially of LIC gov-
ernments should also be specified which, if fulfilled, would
ensure efficient and equitable health systems domestically
and globally. Such a strategy will go a long way towards
fulfilment of the health rights of LIC citizens and all mar-
ginalised populations.
Endnotes
1In this case proportionality (fairness) of the burden takes
into the optimal resources available to each set of actors
(i.e., HIC Vs LICs). Our view is that once it can be demon-
strated that LICs have already borne the maximum burden
they can by using the maximum of their available resources
to fulfill their citizens’ health rights, then it is most likely
that HIC governments will be morally compelled to fulfill
their quota of obligation or there will be a strong moral jus-
tification for the enforcement of such obligations upon re-
calcitrant states.
2Nussbaum’s categorical disregard for “the level of opu-
lence” of a society can be controversial if it is stated, as it
is, without further qualification. This is especially so if she
means that to qualify as just all societies must, with or
without foreign assistance; ensure a certain threshold level
of material and non-material entitlements to all citizens.
Levels of poverty (at a national level) in most resource-
poor countries may make it difficult to achieve a certain
minimum level of material well-being without external as-
sistance even though their internal arrangements are just.
In such a case it might be problematic to judge such a so-
ciety as unjust for the mere reason that they cannot afford
the threshold for all their citizens.
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